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An Ex Parte Order May Not Serve the Function of a 
Search Warrant Under the Fourth Amendment 
To Authorize a Physical Intrusion in 
Connection With a "Search" for 
Conversations-People 11. Grossman* 
There was probable cause to believe that defendant Scandifia 
was implicated in a larceny of jewelry by false pretenses. Pursuant 
to section 813-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure,1 the 
Supreme Court in New York County issued an ex parte order 
authorizing the installation of an eavesdropping device in a service 
station owned by Scandifia. Shortly thereafter, police broke into 
• 45 Misc. 2d 557, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (Sobel, J.) (hereinafter cited 
as principal case). 
l. "An ex parte order for eavesdropping • • • may be issued by any justice of the 
supreme court or judge of a county court or of the court of general sessions of the 
county of New York upon oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or of the attorney• 
general or of an officer above the rank of sergeant of any police department of the 
state or of any political subdivision thereof, that there is reasonable ground to 
believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and particularly describing the 
person or persons whose communications, conversations or discussions arc to be over• 
head [sic] or recorded and the purpose thereof. • • • In connection with the issuance 
of such an order the justice or judge may examine on oath the applicant and any 
other witness he may produce and shall satisfy himself of the existence of reasonable 
grounds for the granting of such application. Any such order shall be effective for 
the time specified therein but not for a period of more than two months unless ex• 
tended or renewed by the justice or judge who signed and issued the original order 
upon satisfying himself that such extension or renewal is in the public interest." 
N.Y. CODE OUM. PRoc. § 81!1-a (Supp. 1965). 
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the station's private office and installed a microphone. Conversations 
were overheard which indicated that defendant Grossman had in his 
possession two pistols received from Scandifia. An affidavit setting 
forth these conversations supplied the sole probable cause for a 
warrant authorizing a search of a car owned by Grossman and seizure 
of the pistols. On the basis of the evidence thus obtained, the 
defendants were indicted for illegal possession of weapons and 
conspiracy. They moved to suppress the tangible product of the. 
search-the pistols-on the ground that the probable cause for the 
issuance of the warrant was based on information obtained in 
violation of their rights under the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments.2 Held, motion granted. Under the fourth and fourteenth 
amendments, no warrant may issue for a search and seizure of mere 
evidence. Electronic eavesdropping, which is inherently a quest 
for mere evidence, must be prohibited regardless of judicial author-
ization, once the protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures has been brought into play by the occurrence of a trespass.8 
In 1928 the Supreme Court of the United States held, in Olm-
stead v. United States,4 that wiretapping is not proscribed by the 
fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. That holding was based on the fact that wiretapping lacks 
the essential characteristics of conventional search and seizure: 
physical entry and seizure ·of tangible property.5 Although Congress 
has since outlawed all wiretapping, 6 the rationale of Olmstead- re-
2. The application of the fourth amendment to the states through the fourteenth 
amendment is well settled. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
3. In a comprehensive opinion, Justice Sobel discussed many constitutional prob• 
lems raised by electronic eavesdropping, but chose to rely on the grounds stated in 
the text. 
4. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
5. Id. at 464-66. 
6. Wiretapping is now governed by § 605 of the Communications Act, 48 Stat. 
1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964), which was interpreted in Nardone v. United States, 
302 U.S. 379 (1937), as prohibiting the admission of wiretap evidence in the federal 
courts. In the second Nardone case, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), the Court interpreted § 605 
as requiring the federal courts to exclude all evidence derived from wiretapping. The 
second Nardone case also indicated that interception alone, even without divulgence, 
constitutes a violation of § 605. But cf. Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping· 
Problem: A Defense Counsel's View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 855, 858 (1960). Section· 605 does 
not, however, protect against the admission of wiretap evidence in state courts. See 
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). But cf. Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739, 744 (2d 
Cir.) (concurring opinion), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 458 (1960). See generally DASH, 
KNOWLTON & SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS 385-406 (1959) [hereinafter cited as DASH]; 
Bradley & Hogan, Wiretapping-From Nardone to Benanti and Rathbun, 46 GEo. L.J. 
418 (1958); Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View, 
44 MINN. L. REv. 891 (1960); Rosenzweig, The Law of Wiretapping, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 
514 (1947); Schwartz, On Current Proposals To Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. 
REv. 157 (1954); Westin, The Wire Tapping Problem-An Analysis and a Legislative 
Proposal, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 165 (1952); Comment, Wiretapping-The Federal Law, 
51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 441 (1960). 
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mains a barrier to the control of other forms of electronic eaves-
dropping. 7 Thus, in Goldman v. United States8 the Court extended 
the rationale of Olmstead to another type of eavesdropping and 
ruled that the placing of a detectaphone on the party wall of a 
hotel room, allowing police to overhear conversations held within 
the adjacent room, did not constitute a violation of the fourth 
amendment. In both Goldman and Olmstead it was noted that a 
different question would have been presented if the eavesdropping 
had been achieved by means of a physical trespass.0 More recently, 
while preserving the basic holding of Olmstead and Goldman that 
the overhearing of conversations does not amount to a technical 
search and seizure, the Court has held that the fourth amendment 
does provide some protection against electronic eavesdropping.10 
Thus, in Silverman v. United States,11 eavesdrop evidence obtained 
by the insertion of a spike microphone into a party wall was ex-
cluded. The Court expressly declined to reconsider Goldman, but 
rather based exclusion of the evidence solely on the finding of "an 
unauthorized physical penetration."12 
Although this language would seem to admit the possibility of 
an authorized "penetration," the question has apparently never been 
faced by an appellate court. Section 813-a of the New York Code 
does not explicitly sanction judicial authorization of physical "pene-
trations" in connection with eavesdropping, but such authorization 
must have been considered implicit in the statute, since the legisla-
ture was primarily concerned with the prevention of unauthorized 
"bugging"-the practice of concealing a microphone within a room, 
typically the home or office of the victim.18 Despite this legislative 
7. The term "electronic eavesdropping" ordinarily includes wiretapping; in this 
note, however, it is used to mean all forms of electronic eavesdropping except wire• 
tapping. 
8. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
9. Id. at 135; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
10. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (memorandum decision), reversing 
Clinton v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963); Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). See also United States v. Pardo-Bolland, 348 F,2d 316 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 34 U.S. L. WEEK 3201 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1965). 
11. Silverman v. United States, supra note 10. 
12. Id. at 509. See Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous In• 
criminating Statements-A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 
U. ILL. L.F. 78, 123 n.206, 123-28; cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), 
13. See REPORT OF THE NEW YORK JOINT LEGISLATIVE CoMMITI'EE ON PRIVAGY OF COM• 
MUNICATIONS AND LICENSURE OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS 17 (1962): "As to eavesdropping 
by secret microphone, on which Congress has never acted, the Supreme Court has 
pronounced new constitutional law. Notably, in the Silverman case of 1961, it reversed 
the conviction of a Washington gambler. District of Columbia Police had driven a 
spike, ingeniously equipped with a microphone, through the wall of Silverman's 
house, thereby overhearing conversations within. The Supreme Court noted that this 
was done without a warrant, and was 'accomplished by means of an unauthorized 
physical encroachment within a constitutionally protected area.' As to this, we observe 
with satisfaction that New York law [§ 813-a], enacted in 1958 on the initiative of 
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intent, the court in the principal case limited, on constitutional 
grounds,14 the application of the statutory procedure to that eaves-
dropping which can be achieved without physical penetration. The 
first premise in the reasoning which led the court to this result 
was that under Silverman "eavesdropping, ... accompanied by a 
trespass, constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure in violation 
of the fourth amendment."15 In the court's view, the entry by which 
the "bug" was planted was a trespass.16 Thus, the court first con-
cluded that the activity in question was unlawful and then pro-
ceeded to inquire whether that prima fade unlawfulness was avoided 
by the court order. 
In answering this question in the negative, the court relied on . 
the rule enunciated in Gouled v. United States17 and other cases18 
that searches for and seizures of objects of "evidentiary value only" 
are prohibited by the fourth amendment. Under the Gouled rule, 
searches made pursuant to a warrant,19 as well as those incident to 
a lmvful arrest without a warrant,20 are limited to fruits of the 
crime, instrumentalities of the crime, and contraband.21 The court 
in the principal case reasoned that since conversations do not fall 
within any of these categories but are mere evidence of guilt, and 
since a search for mere evidence violates the fourth amendment, 
a "search" for conversations is always prohibited, whether authorized 
or not.22 The court was careful to limit this holding to eavesdropping 
achieved by physical intrusion upon a constitutionally protected 
area.28 However, since all successful electronic eavesdropping, re-
gardless of physical intrusion, involves the acquisition of mere 
evidence;- the thrust of the court's reasoning condemns with equal 
force eavesdropping of the type specifically upheld in Goldman. 
this Committee, requires the issuance of a court order (i.e., a warrant) to authorize 
and validate evidence obtained by secret microphone. We hope and trust that this 
will be found in accord with the principles set forth in the Silverman case." (Emphasis 
added.) 
14. Principal case at 574, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 283. 
15. Id. at 562, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 271. 
16. Ibid. 
17. 255 U.S. 298, 309-11 (1921). 
18. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237-38 (1960); Harris v. United 
States, !l31 U.S. 145, 155 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464-66 (1932); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885). See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 2184a, at 45-46 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Shellow, 
The Continuing Vitality of the Gouled Rule-The Search for and Seizure of Evidence, 
48 MARQ. L. REv. 172 (1964); Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary Objects" 
-A Rule in Search of a Reason, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 319 (1953). 
19. See Gouled v. United States, 255. U.S. 298, 309-11 (1921). Compare Zap v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946). 
20. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 466 (1932). 
21. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947). 
22. Principal case at 574, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 282-83; cf. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 163; 
Williams, supra note 6, at 864-67. 
23. Principal case at 578, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 286. 
0 
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Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the force of Mr. Justice Douglas' 
argument in Silverman that the Court should concern itself with 
all the actual, rather than merely the physical, encroachments upon 
privacy.24 Logically the evidence-only rule should apply to all eaves-
dropping if it applies to any, but such an application of the rule 
would be inconsistent with the views expressed in the Olmstead and 
Goldman cases. However, it is arguable that this inconsistency caused 
by the application of the Gouled rule in the principal case might 
have been avoided by use of the analysis to be suggested here. 
Since it is a limitation on what may lawfully be seized, the evi-
dence-only rule can have no application without an initial determina-
tion that there has been a seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment. The instant court's interpretation of the Silverman 
case as holding that electronic eavesdropping involving physical 
penetration amounts to a fourth amendment search and seizure2G is 
therefore of critical importance. This interpretation would seem to 
conflict with the literal construction given the fourth amendment 
by the Supreme Court in Olmstead and Goldman-that conversa-
tions, not being "persons, houses, papers [or] effects"26 are inherently 
incapable of being "seized" in the constitutional sense.27 The court 
in the principal case said, in effect, that Silverman and the later 
case of Wong Sun v. United States28 modified Olmstead and Gold• 
man to the extent that conversations may now be considered to 
have been "seized," within the meaning of the fourth amendment, 
when the eavesdropping is accomplished by means of a physical 
intrusion.29 Such an interpretation would be permissible were it not 
for the express, albeit grudging, refusal by the majority of the 
Court in Silverman to reconsider the holding of Goldman.80 Unless 
this refusal is to be regarded as mere judicial hedging, an alternative 
explanation of Silverman, one consistent with Goldman, is required. 
A more plausible alternative would be to read Silverman as ex-
cluding the eavesdrop evidence not because it was illegally "seized," 
but because its acquisition was "tainted" by a prior illegality-the 
"unauthorized physical penetration."81 This interpretation is rein-
24. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (concurring opinion), 
25. Principal case at 562, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 271. 
26. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. 
27. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). 
28. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
29. Professor Broeder is of the opinion that Silverman and Wong Sun foreshadow 
the ultimate demise of Olmstead and Goldman. See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United 
States-A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 614 (1963): "[T]he main 
premise· of Olmstead is not trespass, but that conversation is not an 'effect.' Silverman 
and Wong Sun destroyed that premise and Olmstead along with it." But see note 31 
infra and accompanying text. 
30. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961). 
31. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). For an 
exposition of the distinction between the exclusion of intangible evidence, such as 
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forced by the Supreme Court's express reliance upon Silverman, in 
the non-eavesdropping context of the Wong Sun case,82 to exclude 
incriminating statements obtained as the result of an illegal entry 
and arrest. The two cases present parallel applications of the same. 
principle; both decisions exclude intangible evidence as the "fruit 
of the poisonous tree," not as illegally seized. In Wong Sun the 
"poisonous tree" was the illegal entry and arrest; in Silverman, it 
was the unauthorized penetration.88 
If this line of reasoning is valid, eavesdropping accompanied 
by a validly authorized penetration would seem to stand on exactly 
the same constitutional footing as that found permissible in Gold-
man, since no prior illegality is present to taint it. The proper 
inquiry in the principal case would then concern the legality of 
the physical intrusion. Under New York law, a forcible, surreptitious 
entry, such as in the principal case, would seem to be lawful when 
validly authorized.84 The intrusion here, however, was not confined 
to the entry of the officer who planted the "bug," but extended to 
the continued presence, for almost five months, of the microphone 
in defendant's office. It would therefore appear that periodically 
incriminating evidence, as illegally "seized," and exclusion as "the fruit of the poison-
ous tree," see Kamisar, supra note 12, at 123-28. As Professor Kamisar points out, there 
has been considerable confusion on this point. Id. at 125. For an illustration of the 
confusion, compare McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458-59 (1948) Gackson, 
J., concurring), with Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959). 
32. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). 
33. The author of the opinion in the principal case takes a different view of Silver-
man and Wong Sun. See SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN nm LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
105 (1964): 
"Silverman is thus the first recent (see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471 (1963)) practical recognition of the dual nature of the Fourth Amendment-
that the first or privacy clause forbids the search for evidence (with or without a 
wanant) by trespass into the privacy of home, office, etc.-while the second or 
search warrant clause permits search for tangibles to which the People or Gov-
ernment have the primary right but only with a search warrant." 
It is difficult to understand the basis for these conclusions. Neither Silverman nor 
Wong Sun discusses the evidence-only rule. Moreover, there is nothing to in<;licate that 
exclusion was based on anything other than the initial illegality-the pen~tration in• 
Silverman and the entry and arrest in Wong Sun. In fact there were positive indica-
tions that had valid warrants been obtained the evidence would have been admissible. 
See Wong v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505, 509 (1961). 
34. See N.Y. ConE CRIM. PRoc. § 799 (Supp. 1965), which allows forcible entries to 
preserve evidence. Section 801 permits nighttime searches when specially authorized. 
Section 813-a must be read as implicitly authorizing such tactics in view of the pecu-
liar requirements of "bug" planting. See note 13 supra. See also People v. Johnson, 
231 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1962) (search of unoccupied premises held constitu-
tional). 
Under this analysis it would seem arguable that the legality of the trespass depends 
on its purpose and therefore that a trespass to secure mere evidence may not be au-
thorized. Under the fourth amendment as construed in Olmstead and Goldman, how-
ever, the securing of this type of evidence, i.e., conversations, does not require author-
ization. Thus the purpose is constitutionally permissible and cannot be used to in-
validate the physical intru~on. 
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renewed, validly issued judicial authorization would be required 
both by the fourth amendment and by section 813-a for the duration 
of the intrusion.85 Although the court found that there was sufficient 
probable cause to support the initial issuance of the eavesdrop 
order, no new probable cause was supplied to support the two ex-
tensions of the order.86 Thus, when the incriminating conversations 
were finally overheard some four months after the initial issuance 
of the order, there was no effective probable cause to justify the 
continued intrusion, and the authorizing order would have been 
invalid for that reason alone.37 Moreover, the fact that the "bug" 
was in operation for so long a time, regardless of probable cause, 
would seem to render the search exploratory, placing it within the 
proscription of the fourth amendment.88 
Thus, had the court confined its inquiry to the legality of the 
intrusion, it would have reached the same result that it eventually 
reached through its application of the evidence-only rule. In placing 
full reliance on that rule, however, the court necessarily outlawed 
all eavesdropping accompanied by an intrusion. A narrower inquiry, 
based solely on the legality of the intrusion, would have allowed 
eavesdropping when reasonable-when there is effective probable 
cause to support the court order, and the length of operation does 
not render the search exploratory.30 
The unavoidable result of the decision in the principal case 
appears to be that a New York policeman who has probable cause 
and obtains a court order may eavesdrop only if the circumstances 
enable him to do so without a physical intrusion. Freedom from 
official eavesdropping is thus made to depend on the sophistication 
of police equipment or the thickness of a wall.40 Moreover, if the 
rationale of the principal case were applied in a jurisdiction which 
provides no statutory safeguards against eavesdropping,41 as it must 
35. New York provides for renewal or extension when the judge who originally 
issued the, eavesdrop order satisfies himself that it is in the public interest. N.Y. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. § 813-a (Supp. 1965). Cf. Westin, supra note 6, at 203-04. 
36. Principal case at 568, ~57 N.Y.S.2d at 277. 
37. See People v. Chippewa Circuit Judge, 226 Mich. 326, 197 N.W. 539 (1924). 
38. See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). 
39. The requirement that the warrant particularly describe the things to be seized, 
discussed in the principal case at 567-68, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 276-77, does not arise under 
the suggested interpretation of Silverman (see text accompanying note 27 supra) since 
nothing is seized. The same is true of the problem of "unrelated" seizures, discussed 
in the principal case at 568-69, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 276-77. However, the problem of new 
probable cause to support the extensions of the order is common to both approaches, 
regardless of whether there is a seizure. The court apparently concluded that lack of 
new probable cause vitiated the order, but declined to rest its decision on this con• 
clusion. See principal case at 568, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 277. 
40. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961) (concurring opinion of 
Douglas, J.). 
41. New York was the first state to provide for court-ordered eavesdropping; three 
other states have subsequently enacted similar statutes. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 272, 
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be if it is required by the fourth amendment, the result would be 
even more anomalous. For example, a policeman could not employ 
a "spike mike" even if he had probable cause and had obtained a 
warrant. However, a policeman with a parabolic microphone42 could 
eavesdrop without any restriction whatever. 
It is arguable that, on the basis of past Supreme Court decisions, 
primarily Olmstead and Goldman, the question of the applicability 
of the evidence-only rule should never have been reached in the 
principal case.48 However, there is a distinct possibility that these 
cases will ultimately be overruled and eavesdropping brought 
within the terms of the fourth amendment.44 Should this occur, 
the rationale of the principal case in applying the evidence-only 
rule would assume great significance. The application of the 
Gouled rule would result in the complete prohibition of eaves-
dropping,45 eliminating any possibility of a judicially controlled 
process. There are cogent arguments against the application of the 
Gouled rule to electronic eavesdropping,46 and there is no compel-
§ 99 (Supp. 1964); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 200.660, 200.670 (1959); ORE. REv. STAT. § 171.720 
(1959). See also DASH 430-37. 
42. For a description of devices that require no physical penetration, see DASH 
346-58. 
43. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra. 
44. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Beaney, The Constitutional 
Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REv. 212; Symposium on The 
Griswold Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197 (1965). Griswold is signi-
ficant both for its expansive approach to the Bill of Rights and for its discussion of a 
right of privacy. See also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 457-63 (1962), where 
Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Goldberg indicated their disagreement with Olmstead, 
and the separate opinion of the Chief Justice, 373 U.S. at 441, suggesting that he 
might join in overruling at least Goldman. 
45. It has been assumed throughout this note that conversations are inherently 
mere evidence. In certain instances, however, the courts have broadened the meaning 
of "instrumentalities" to avoid the effect of the Gouled rule. For example, in a con-
spiracy case conversations might be considered the instrumentalities of the crime. Cf. 
Kamisar, supra note 6, at 914-18. 
46. The Gouled rule is probably a historical anomaly. See 8 WIGMORE § 2264 n.4; 
Kamisar, supra note 6, at 914 n.129; Comment, supra note 18. It has been said the rule 
cannot be justified on policy grounds. See Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil 
Liberties-The Prosecutor's Stand, 53 J. CRIM. L., C. &: P.S. 85, 87 (1962); Kamisar, 
Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and Some "Theories," 53 J. CRIM. 
L., C. &: P.S. 171, 177 (1962). Applications of the evidence-only rule have led to striking 
inconsistencies. Compare Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), with Zap v. 
United States, 328 U.s: 624 (1946). One court concluded that the issue as to what are 
instrumentalities as opposed to mere evidence "turns more on the good faith of the 
search than the actual distinction between the matters turned up." Matthews v. Cor-
rea, 135 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1943). This has led to the suggestion that the rule would 
not stand in the way of a comprehensive statutory scheme for the regulation of wire-
tapping. See Kamisar, supra note 6, at 916-18. The same considerations would seem 
applicable to eavesdropping. But see Williams, supra note 6, at 870-71, where it is 
suggested that the Gouled rule is inapplicable to wiretapping only insofar as the tele-
phone itself, as opposed to the conversations, is considered an "instrumentality." 
The Supreme Court has applied the rule only in cases involving the seizure of pri-
vate papers. See Shellow, supra note 18, at 179. Moreover, Mr. Justice Jackson once 
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ling case for its application, because the rule does not attack the 
most objectionable aspect of eavesdropping. The most obnoxious 
feature of electronic eavesdropping is not that it permits the ac-
quisition of mere evidence, but that it invades privacy to an extent 
heretofore unknown, and in such a way that the individual has 
little or no opportunity to know of the invasion.47 It would seem 
that the rejection of the evidence-only rule would be far more 
likely if there were a sound basis for allowing limited eavesdropping 
under safeguards which rendered it no more objectionable than 
conventional investigatory practice. Although a detailed examina-
tion of the regulatory problem is beyond the scope of the present 
discussion, ttvo observations are appropriate. It is well accepted 
that the requirement of probable cause is the heart of the fourth 
amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 48 
The probable-cause requirement does not protect pl'ivacy in general. 
The fourth amendment permits invasions of privacy, provided there 
is sufficient probability that the offended individuals are guilty of 
a crime. It is submitted that electronic eavesdropping is as capable 
of fulfilling this probable-cause requirement as any conventional 
method of search.49 With regard to eavesdropping, however, the re-
quirement of probable cause establishing that the thing to be seized 
will be found in the place to be searched is especially pertinent. 
For example, in the principal case the investigating officer should 
have been required to show not only that the defendant was prob-
ably implicated in the crime, but also that there was reason to 
believe he would be discussing the crime in his office during the 
period of the proposed eavesdropping.50 If this requirement were 
strictly observed, the possibility of overhearing irrelevant conversa-
tions _would seem to be diminished. Furthermore, the time span 
covered by the eavesdropping is crucial. It would seem that the 
statutory period of two months in New York is too long,51 and that 
a reasonable period should be measured in hours or days, not 
months. A longer period suggests a "fishing expedition" and would 
render the search exploratory. 
suggested that the rule of the Gouled case was "inapposite in the field of mechanical or 
electronic devices designed to overhear or intercept conversations." On Lee v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952). See also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 140 
n.7 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting). But see Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463-65 
(1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 311 n.17 (2d Cir. 
1951) (Frank, J., dissenting). 
47. See Schwartz, supra note 6; Williams, supra note 6, at 862-68. See also Paulsen, 
Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 65, 72 (1957). 
48. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
49. See ibid. 
50. It seems likely that once there is probable cause to believe that the suspect is 
implicated in the crime, satisfaction of this additional requirement will tend to be 
assumed. Cf. Westin, supra note 6, at 203. 
51. But see id. at 203-04. 
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It is possible that these and other appropriate restrictions, vigor-
ously observed,62 ·would render the practice of electronic eavesdrop-
ping virtually useless to law-enforcement officers.53 On the other 
hand, it has been persuasively argued that no amount of safeguards 
can be sufficient to bring the practice within the realm of what ought 
to be permissible.54 As was emphasized by Justice Sobel in the 
principal case, 55 the secrecy surrounding the issuance of eavesdrop-
ping orders, and the fact that the courts encounter only that eaves-
dropping which successfully obtains evidence of guilt, probably 
preclude a valid judgment as to either the indispensability of 
eavesdropping to law enforcement or the actual danger of eaves-
dropping to privacy. Although Justice Sobel is to be commended for 
his scholarly explanation and application of constitutional princi-
ples, his reliance on the evidence-only rule in the principal case 
seems unfortunate, since he 
1
passed up an opportunity for experi-
mentation in judicial control. A holding that the practice under 
consideration was unconstitutional in this particular case because 
it was unreasonable, not because the evidence-only rule renders it 
unconstitutional in every case, might have been a better first step 
toward a "solution where the rights of individual liberty and the 
needs of law enforcement are fairly accommodated."56 Assuming 
that such a solution is possible, it can be devised only by experiment-
ing with meaningful standards of control. 
52. In his discussion of a possible federal law authorizing wiretapping, Edward 
Bennett Williams has suggested that one judge in each district be appointed by the 
Chief Justice to handle wiretap applications, in order to ensure conscientious judicial 
supervision and prevent "judge-shopping." See Williams, supra note 6, at 869. 
53. Cf. id. at 869. Law enforcement officials are reluctant to submit wiretapping 
and eavesdropping to traditional controls. See, e.g., Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdrop-
ping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44 MINN. L. R.Ev. 835 (1960). One reason for this 
reluctance may be that wiretapping and eavesdropping are not used in traditional 
ways. That is, they are used for surveillance and crime prevention rather than crime 
detection. See Parker, Surveillance by Wiretap or Dictagraph: Threat or Protection1 
A Police Chief's Opinion, 42 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 727 (1954). See also DASH 129, 221-22, 251. 
Section 813-a authorizes the issuance of orders for eavesdropping when there is prob-
able cause to believe that "evidence of crime," i.e., crime in general, will thereby be 
obtained. As is pointed out in the principal case at 568-69, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 277, the 
fourth amendment would seem to require probable cause as to evidence of a specific, 
named crime. 
54. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 6, at 855. 
55. Principal case at 579-80, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 287. 
56. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See 
Westin, Wiretapping-The Quiet Revolution, 29 COMMENTARY 333, 340 (1960). 
